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Comments
AMOUNT OF

FORCE AN OFFICER MAY USE TO EFFECT THE ARREST
OF A MISDEMEANANT

The case of State v. Browers' again brings up the problem, which has
had a varied and controversial career in the Missouri courts-the use of deadly
force in the arrest of misdemeanants. In the Browers case, the evidence disclosed
that the defendant, Harvey Browers, jumped on a city marshal's back in order to

1. 205 S.W. 2d 721 (Mo. 1947).
(76)
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stop him from shooting at Irwin Browers, the defendant's brother, who was fleeing
from the marshal after he had been told he was under arrest. In the ensuing
struggle the marshal was shot by a bullet from his own gun. Defendant was convicted of felonious assault and appealed, one ground being that the trial court erred
in failing to instruct on the law of self-defense. This raises the problem of the use
of deadly force in stopping Irwin Browers who was in flight. If the marshal had no
right to shoot at the fleeing man, then Harvey Browers had the right of self-defense
2
to protect his brother.
The majority opinion takes the view that there is evidence that Irwin Browers
had not committed a crime at all, and so the marshal shot at him while trying to
make an illegal arrest. If this view is taken then probably no court would say that
the officer had a right to use deadly fdrce to stop the fleeing person, and most
courts would allow the person to use such force as is necessary to prevent the
arrest.8 The majority also cite State ex rel. Kaercker v. Rot., 4 that an officer is
never justified in shooting at one guilty of a misdemeanor to effectuate his arrest
or prevent his escape.
A separate concurring opinion written by Judge Ellison, and concurred in by
Judge Leedy, takes the view that there was substantial evidence showing that the
officer used more force than was reasonably necessary, but that it was a legal
arrest. The marshal could have been arresting Irwin Browers either for a felony
based on reasonable suspicion, or a misdemeanor (breach of peace) committed
in the officer's presence. Judge Ellison contends that the officer's rights are governed
by specific statutes of Missouri, the one dealing with the problem being § 3960. 5 The
argument advanced is that this section appears in the Article on Process and covers
both felonies and misdemeanors, making no distinction between a culprit in flight
or one who resists, and so the officer's right would be the same in both cases.
As to resisting misdemeanants, the majority of courts in the United States follow
the rule that an officer is not privileged to kill to overcome the resistance of a
misdemeanant except, of course, in the case of self-defense where the officer is
privileged, if reasonably necessary, to kill to protect himself.6 At least two courts,
namely Missouri and North Carolina, have rejected this view. In Missouri the
court has changed its position with respect to this problem a number of times.? As
Judge Ellison points out, the latest decision, State v. Fords expressly over-ruled the
2. Mo. REv. STAT. § 4379 (1939); State v. Eastham, 240 Mo. 241, 144 S.W.
492 (1912).
3. WHARTON, HOMICIDE § 503 (3d ed. 1907).
4. 330 Mo. 105, 49 S.W. 2d 109 (1932).
5. "If, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee
or forcibly resist, the officer may use all necessary means to effect the arrest." Mo.
REV. STAT. § 3960 (1939).
6. Smith v. State, 59 Ark. 132, 26 S.W. 712 (1894); supra note 3 at § 490;
4 AM. JuR; Arrest, § 78; Comment, MicH. L. REv. 957 (1930); 5 Mo. L. REv.
93 (1940); See note, 3 A.L.R. 1170.
7. State v. McNalley, 87 Mo. 644 (1885); State v. Dierberger, 96 Mo. 666,
10 S.W. 168 (1888); State v. Ford, 344 Mo. 1219, 130 S.W. 2d 635 (1939).
8. 344 Mo. 1219, 130 S.W. 2d 635 (1939).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss1/8
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two opinionsP cited by the majority as supporting their decision in the Browsers
case. The Ford case concerned a resisting misdemeanant, though it considered but
did not decide what the law would be when the misdemeanant flees. It would seem,
however, that most of the cases involving resistance rest on the officer's right of selfdefense and not on his right to kill a resisting misdemeanant. The Missouri rule has
'been criticized on the ground that the courts are really only trying to broaden
the officer's right of self-defense so that he may be privileged where it is his duty
to arrest and move forward, thus necessarily becoming the aggressor. The Missouri
rule, by introducing two separate theories by which the officer may be exonerated,
merely tends to confuse the jury. See 5 Mo. L. REv. 93 (1940).
As to fleeing misdemeanants, tlhe almost universal rule of American courts
is that the officer has no right to kill or threaten with serious bodily harm in order
to effectuate his arrest or prevent his escape.10
Only three Missouri decisions have been found which actually involve the right
to use force against a person who is fleeing. In two of these cases, Gray v. Earls1
and State v. McGehee,12 there seems to have been no right to make an arrest at
all, in the former (a civil action) because the misdemeanor was not committed in
the presence of the private citizen who was seeking to make the arrest and in the
latter because no crime of any nature had been committed. The third case, State
ex rel. Kaercer v. Rotl,'18 was a civil action for damages brought by a passenger
in the automobile of a fleeing misdemeanant who was injured when a pursuing
officer fired into the car. In all of these cases the court stated that an officer may
not kill a fleeing misdemeanant in order to prevent his escape.
In 1939, in State v. Ford,1 4 the court, in an opinion by Judge Ellison, reviewed
its previous decisions and for the first time considered § 3571 of the Missouri
Revised Statutes (1929), now § 3960 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (1939),
which first appeared as § 1827 of the Revised Statutes of 1879. This statute had
never been construed by the Missouri court, and the only mention it had received
in this type of situation was in State v. Banks (1914)1 5 in which there was dictum
that it does not justify the use of unnecessary force in making an arrest. In the
Ford case the court said that on its face the statute would appear to authorize the
use of all means necessary to effect an arrest, even shooting, of either a misdemeanant or felon, both" in case of flight and physical resistance. This is about
the same view as expressed in the concuring opinion in the Browers case. But
the court specifically pointed out that it was not necessary to determine what
kind or amount of force an officer may use to effect an arrest of a misdemeanant when fleeing-the case concerned a situation where the prisoner forcibly 'resisted
9.
v.,Roth,
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

State v. McGehee, 308 Mo. 560, 274 S.W. 70 (1925); State ex rel Kaercber
330 Mo. 105, 49 S.W. 2d 109 (1932).
Material cited note 6 supra.
298 Mo. 116, 135, 250 S.W. 567, 573 (1922).
308 Mo. 560, 274 S.W. 70 (1925).
330 Mo. 105, 49 S.W. 2d 109 (1932).
Supra note 8.
258 Mo. 479, 167 S.W. 505 (1914).
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arrest. So although. State v. Ford decided the question as- to the amount of force
an officer can use in the case of a resisting misdemeanant, and specifically over8
ruled State v. McGehee and State ex rel. Kaercher v. Roth" on that point, it left
the solution to the problem of the non-resisting misdemeanant indefinite.
The whole question of killing in order to effect an arrest has been the subject
of much controversy. The common law and Missouri rule permits the killing of
fleeing felons,1 7 although the killing must be as a last resort.' 8 This rule has been
vigorously attacked, and the suggestion made that there should be no right to kill
any fleeing criminal.' 9 A Texas statute seems to so provide.20 Other statutes give
a right to kill fleeing persons who have committed certain specified crimes,21 and
there are cases indicating that the right to kill .fleeing felons, is restricted to capital
felonies.22 If the danger that one who has committed a capital offense will repeat
it is regarded as greater than the danger that a police officer in shooting at him
will, as does occur,28 kill an innocent bystander, then there is some reason for
24
the latter rule.
In arriving at the most desirable solution to the problem, consideration should
be given to the rights of the individuals, both officer and arrestee, and to the protection and interests of society. Certainly in the case of misdemeanants all these
interests are best served by prohibiting the officer from killing the misdemeanant
except where it is necessary in self-defense. There is little or no danger to the public in allowing him to remain at large as in the cases of dangerous felons. As was
stated in the Kaercker case: "As the lawmaking power itself could not inflict the
death penalty as a punishment for a misdemeanor, it would ill become the 'majesty'
of the law'to sacrifice a human life to avoid a failure of justice in the case of a petty
offender who is often brought into court without arrest and dismissed with a nominal

fine.'" In our society every person's life, in theory at least, is an asset, and even
in the case of a felon the law throws every protection around him, requiring a

16. Supra notes 12 and 13, respectively.
17. At common law the only felonies were said to be murder, manslaughter,
arson, burglary, robbery, rape, sodomy, mayhem, and larceny. See 1 BuRnicK, LAw
oF CRIMES § 77 (1946).
18. WHARTON, HOMICmE § 489 (3d ed. 1907); 4 AM. JuR. § 78; 34 LAw NoTEs
66 (1930-1931). Fitzpatrick v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 385, 275 S.W. 819 (1925).
19. See Wechsler and Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COL.
L. REv. at 740 (1937), and see id. n. 153.
20. TEx STAT., Penal Code, Art. 1212, § 8 (Vernon, 1936): "The officer or
other person executing an order of arrest is required to use such force as may be
necessary to prevent an escape when it is attempted, but.he shall not in any case
kill one who attempts to escape, unless in making or attempting such escape the
life of the officer is endangered, or he is threatened with great bodily injury."
21. See; e.g., COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48 § 45 (1935).
22. See State v. Bryant, 65 N. C. 327 (1871).
23. Compare the facts of State ex rel. Kaercher v. Roth, supra note 13.
24. Compare Sec. 4 of the Uniform Arrest Act, commented upon in Warner,
The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, at 328-330 (1942). The Act does not
permit the use of dangerous force to effect the arrest of a misdemeanant. Ibid;
ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROcmURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL p. 26 (1947).
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grand jury indictment or information before he can be tried, and a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury of 12 men before he can be punished. Certainly
then an officer should have no right to kill a minor offender. Even though the
arrestee may get away at that particular time, he may be arrested later. If he isn't,
nd harm is done which justifies killing him.
The argument in the concurring opinion in the Browers case in favor of the
officer's right to kill a fleeing misdemeanant is based upon the fact that the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is purely technical, the penalty actually
impoged for the latter frequently being greater than that imposed for many felonies,
and on the statute- authorizing an officer to use all necessary means to effect an
arrest. As to the first point, it presents a forceful reason for adopting, by statute, the
view that the officer may not kill any fleeing felon,25 or at least that he may kill
only if the one fleeing has committed a capital offense.20 It hardly justifies extending
the common law rule. The point concerning the statute depends upon an interpretation of "necessary means to effect an arrest"27 It is not a necessary construction
that this statute sanctions killing an offender who is fleeing. Statutes in derogation
of the common law are strictly construed. And it is fairly arguable that the statute
represents only an attempt to state the common law rule. Similar statutes in other
states have been so construed.28
GENE S. MARTIN

THE FEDERAL NATURAL GAS ACT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
In the case of Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company v. Public Service Commission of Indiana,1 the problem concerning the state's ability to regulate interstate commerce was again brought to light. The Panhandle Pipe Line Company
transported natural gas from Texas and Kansas fields into and across intervening
states, including Indiana, to Ohio and Michigan. In Indiana, it furnished gas to
local public utility distributing companies, who in turn supplied over 112,000 residential, commercial and industrial consumers. In addition, Panhandle also sold
gas in large amounts direct to certain corporations for industrial consumption.
In 1944, the Public Service Commission of Indiana decided that such direct service
was subject to regulation by the commission, and issued an order in 1945 for tho
25. See Wechsler and Michael, supra n. 18, at p. 741, n. 153.
26. See Colorado statute cited supra n. 21. Such statutes as these seem to
clarify the officer's position with regard to the amount of force he can use to effect
the arrest of fleeing criminals. He knows that he is justified in killing only when
arresting for certain specific crimes, and thus these statutes exert considerable
restraint on the officer tending toward caution on his part, which- is probably desirable in most cases. The problem of what is reasonable force or a last resort in each
particular case would continue to appear, but this type of statute would seem
to give more desirable results than does the common law rule and is a step in the
right direction.
27. Mo. REv. STAT. § 3960 (1939), quoted supra n. 5. (italics mine).
28. See Pearson, The Right to Kill in Making Arrests, 28 MICH. L. REv. 957 at
972 (1930).
1. 68 Sup. Ct. 190 (1947).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1949
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filing of tariffs with the commission. In 1946 Panhandle brought suit to set aside
and enjoin the enforcement of the commission's order. The Supreme Court of
Indiana2 held that even if the acts in question constituted sales in interstate commerce, nevertheless they were subject to the state's power of regulation under the
8
doctrine of Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia.

Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Justice Rutledge
delivered the opinion of the court which held that it did not question that the sales
under review were interstate commerce, and rejected the theory that when the gas
entered the branch lines and the pressure was. reduced thereon, such constituted a
"breaking of the bulk" thlis making it intrastate commerce for regulatory purposes.
It was pointed out that the states could control the sales where such were direct
interstate sales to the local consumers (citing the case of Pennsylvania Gas Company v. Public'Service Commission' ) but that the courts had held that the states

could not interfere where the service interstate was to local distributing companies
for resale to the consumers (citing the case of Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Com-

pany5). Mr. Justice Rutledge then stated that the Natural Gas Act was passed to
reach those sales which under the previous decisions could not be covered by state
regulation, yet which the Federal Government had failed to regulate. The Natural
Gas Act8 applies to transportation in interstate commerce, as well as to sales in interstate commerce for resale for ultimate public consumption of any type. But the act
specifically stated that it should not apply to any other transportation or sale of.
natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities psed for
such distribution.
The Supreme Court then held that the action of Congress "was an unequivocal
recognition of the vital interests of the states and their people. . . in the regulation
of rates and service."' 7 It was pointed out that the Natural Gas Act was not designed to reduce the regulatory powers of the states. "Congress, it is true, occupied
a field. But it was meticulous to take in only territory which this court had held
the states could not reach."" Thus it was held that since Congress by the passage
of the Natural Gas Act, had not intended to occupy the field where the sales were
interstate directly to the consumer, and since under the Pennsylvania Gas Company
decision, such sales would be regulated by the state, the sales in question made by
the Panhandle Pipe Line Company were subject to control by the Indiana Public
Service Commission.
The cases dealing with the regulation of the transportation and distribution
of natural gas by both state and federal agencies have produced many interesting
problems. It has generally been accepted that the transportation of natural gas from
2.
662,'71
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Public Service Commission v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 224 Ind.
N.E. 2d 117 (1947).
12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851).
252 U. S. 23 (1920).
265 U. S. 298 (1924).
52 STAT. 821, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1946).
68 Sup. Ct. 190, 198 (1947).
68 Sup. Ct. 190, 196 (1947).
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one state to another, is a transaction in interstate commerce. For many years
the courts accepted as law the intimation of Chief Justice Marshall in the early
cases, that the power to regulate commerce between the states was exclusively
in the Federal Government.' ° But in 1851 the Supreme Court of the United States
1
in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of PhiladelphiaP
set out the doctrine
that although a transaction is considered interstate commerce, yet if it is of such
local concern as to make it impracticable for federal regulation, the states may still
regulate said commerce -providing such regulation does not interfere substantially
with interstate commerce. This doctrine was applied in the case of Pennsylvania
Gas Company v. Public Service Commission.12 There the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the delivery of gas from Pennsylvania to Jamestown, New
York, directly to the consumers was interstate commerce, but that the sale to
said consumers was'so local in nature that it could be regulated by the New York
Commission so long as the Federal Government had not acted to control it.
The main case differs from the Pennsylvania Gas Company case only in that
here there were sales both directly to the consumers (industrial) and to the local
distributing companies. The latter having been held to be interstate commerce
which can be regulated only by the Federal Govern'ment, the question is whether
where both are found together, the former may be regulated by the states.
In the Pennsylvania Gas Company case, the court attempted to distinguish
the Landon case' 3 therefrom. There the Kansas Natural Gas Company owned
pipe line extending from gas fields in Oklahoma to Kansas and Missouri, where it
delivered gas to local distributing companies in 37 cities in Kansas and eight in
Missouri. The arrangement provided that the pipe line company was to receive
two thirds of the rate charged by the local distributing companies as compensation
for said gas. The' question was whether the respective state public utility commissions had the authority to set up rates for the sale by the distributing companies
"of the gas to the local consumers. The United States Supreme Court held that
"... in no proper sense can it be said, under the facts here disclosed, that sale and
dlivery of gas to their customers at burner-tips by the local companies operating
under special franchises constituted any part of interstate commerce ....
Interstate
movement ended when the gas passed into local mains." 4 The sole distinguishing
feature between the Pennsylvania Gas Company case and the Landon case was that
in the latter there was an intervention of the local distributing companies. The
9. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229 (1911); Haskell v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 224 U. S. 217 (1912); Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, 249
U. S. 236 (1919); Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 252 U. S.
23 (1920); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U. S. 277 (1921); Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923); Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265
U. S. 298 (1924).
10. U. S. CONsT. ART. VIII, § 3; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824);
Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat 419 (V. S. 1827).
11. Supra note 3.
12. Supra note 4.
13. Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236 (1919).
14. Id. at 245
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Court seemed to think that the sale to the local distributing companies was sufficient
to bring the interstate character to an end, and that the states could regulate any

activity thereafter. The Landon case was specifically approved by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Com-

pany.1 There the pipe line company increased its rate to the local distributing
companies in Missouri, and contended that the state had no power to control such
rates. Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court held that the subsequent
sale and delivery by the distributing companies was intrastate commerce and subject to state regulation. "But here the sale of gas is in wholesale quantities, not to
consumers, but to distributing companies for resale to consumers in numerous
cities and communities in different states. The transportation, sale and delivery
constitute an unbroken chain, fundamentally interstate from beginning to end...,.
The paramount interest is not local, but national, admitting of and requiring uniformity of regulation. Such uniformity, even though it be the uniformity of governmental nonaction, may be highly necessary to preserve equality of opportunity and
treatment among the various communities and states concerned."6

In 1919, the Supreme Court of West Virginiall held that where electrical
current was transmitted from Virginia to West Virginia by high tension wires, then
reduced to commercial voltage and distributed directly to various consumers, such
was interstate commerce, but "The price at which a commodity is sold is essentially
local, affecting chiefly those in the community where it is made, and only incidentally. . . touching those outside of the community."' s The court held that such
rates could be controlled by the state, and rejected the view that the reducing of
the voltage terminated interstate commerce.
In 1922, however, the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of State ex rel
Helm v. Kansas Natural Gas Company19 went so far as to apply the doctrine "of
the Pennsylvania Gas Company case to the situation where the interstate shipment
of gas was to a local distributor for resale to the local consumer. The court compared the case with the Pennsylvania Gas Company case and thought that "So far
as the Kansas Natural Gas Co. is concerned, the distributing- companies in this
state may be considered the consumers of the gas sold. If that is correct, there is
no difference between'the present case and the Pennsylvania Gas Co. Case." 20 It
held that the regulation of the sale of natural gas was necessary, and since Congress
had not attempted to regulate such sald, the regulation was not national in character and could be controlled by the various states. This case has not been followed
I
by the courts to any extent.
rel
Cities
Service
Company v.
To the other extreme is the case of State ex
21
Public Service Commission where the Missouri Supreme Court held that the state
15.

16.
17.
100 S.E.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Supra note 5.

Id. at 309.
Mill Creek Coal &Coke Co. v. Public Service Commission, 84 W. Va. 662,
557, 7 A.L.R. 108 (1919).
Id. at 674, 100 S.E. at 562.
111 Kan. 809, 208 Pac. (1922).
Id. at 812, 208 Pac. at 623.
337 Mo. 809, 85 S.W. 2d 890 (1935).
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could not regulate the price at which gas was sold by the pipe line company directly
to the industrial consumers. There the gas was piped into the state and sold to certain distributing companies and also directly to twelve companies for industrial use
outside the cities. The court held that ". . .the only reasonable inference to be
drawn from the evidence is that the gas is delivered from the foreign state directly
to the industrial consumer in the state in compliance with a contract that was in
existence between such"consumer and the Pipe Line.... It therefore follows...that
the Pipe Line was engaged in interstate commerce when it was delivering gas to the
12 industries and that the Commission does not have jurisdiction of the Pipe Line
on account of these sales. .. 22 This case ignored the holding in the Pennsylvania
Gas Company case, and found that such sales directly to the consumer were not
local, but national in character, and could not be regulated by the state. The reason
for this holding might be found in the fact that in the Pennsylvania Gas Company
case the sales were made directly to many individuals to supply their household
needs, while in the Cities Service case, the sales were made directly to large in-.
dustrial consumers in such great quantities as to justify the finding that the
transaction was national in character.
This review of the cases indicates that although some courts have deviated
from the accepted view, it is safe to say that the rule of the Pennsylvania Gas
Company case is well established in connection with the'power of the state to control the interstate sale of gas directly to the consumer, as is the rule set out in
Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Company with regard tb the inability of the state
to.control the interstate sale of gas to the Ibcal distributing companies for resale to
the consuming public.
In addition to the doctrine set ,out in the Pennsylvania Gas Company case,
there was formulated another theory by which' the states might control the sale
of gas shipped into them from a foreign state. To determine when such a shipment
changed from interstate to intrastate commerce, the courts utilized Chief Justice
Marshall's "Original Package Doctrine. ' 23 The Supreme Court of Kansas24 was
the first to use this doctrine to determine when the shipment of gas became intrastate commerce. The question in that case was whether the Public Utilities Commission of Kansas had jurisdiction to control the rates charged by the local distributing companies for gas shipped from Oklahoma to Kansas and delivered to
those companies by the Kansas Natural Gas Company. The court conceded that
the transportation of natural gas from one state to another was interstate commerce. But it held that "The original package of gas is broken when the first gas
is taken out of the pipe lines and sold in this state.... The gas, when sold, had become mixed with the common mass of property in this state by being so commingled with gas produced here as to completely lose its identity.2rs The court
also indicated that interstate commerce was at an end when the bulk of the im22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 824, 85 S.W. 2d at 897.
Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827).
State v. Flannelly, 96 Kan. 372, 152 Pac. 22 (1915).
Id. at 383, 152 Pac. at 26.
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ported gas was broken up for indiscriminate distribution to individual purchasers

at retail sales.
Another early and very important case which set forth the original package
doctrine as a method of determining the distinction between interstate and intrastate commerce in gas was that of West Virginia and Maryland Gas Company v.
Towers. 2 8 There the gas company obtained gas in West Virginia and piped it to
Maryland where the pressure was reduced to that satisfactory for consumption,
and it was sold to the local consumers. In determining whether the rates to the
consumers could be controlled by the state, the Supreme Court of Maryland cited
the Flannelly case with approval, and pointed out that when the gas entered the
intermediate lines the pressure was reduced thereon because the pressure in the
main pipe line was too high for service to the consfimers. "At this point it is separated from the other gas in the main pipe and forced into the intermediate lines,
from whence it cannot return to the main line, but remains in such intermediate pipe
line to be consumed when needed." 27 The court held that this separation of the
gas from the main pipe line was such a breaking of the original package as to remove
it from interstate commerce and subject it to state regulation.
In Public Utilities Commission v. Landon28 where the facts were the same as in
the Flannelly case, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the sale of
gas by the local distributing companies to the consumers was purely intrastate commerce. The court did not discuss the original package doctrine but thought that
the interstate movement ended when the gas passed into the local mains.
In 1937 the question of when the transportation of gas ceases to be interstate
commerce and becomes intrastate commerce was dealt with in the case of Department of Public Utilities v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Company.29 There the gas
company purchased gas in Texas and Louisiana and transported it into Arkansas
where it was delivered to certain industries and public utility distributing companies. The Arkansas Department of Public Utilities ordered the gas company to
file certain forms with it, concerning said activities. The company refused, contending that as the gas was transported in interstate commerce, the Public Utilities
Commission had no jurisdiction over it. The Supreme Court of Arkansas pointed
out that the department relied on the original package theory, and held that "At
all times there is a supply of gas in the thousand miles of mains ....
Such gas... is
affected by heat and cold, and by climatic variations."30 In case of shutdown of
consumers, the transportation of gas would be delayed indefinitely. The court
then concluded that the conception to be drawn from the course of the gas company's action ". . .is that it has developed a practical system whereby, if let alone,
more than half of its sales in Arkansas will escape regulation by the state. . ."3 It
26. 134 Md. 137, 106 At. 265 (1919).
27, Id. at 145, 106 At. at 268.
28. Supra note 13.

29. 194 Ark. 354, 108 S.W. 2d 586 (1947).
30. Id. at 370, 108 S.W. 2d at 594.
31. Id. at 371, 108 S.W. 2d at 594.
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held -that the state did have the power to regulate the activities in question. The
Supreme Court of the United States, however, refused to decide whether such transactions were interstate or intrastate commerce, holding that the filing of rates was
not a burden on interstate commerce, thus no constitutional question was involved. 2
In 1931, the original package doctrine was again given the support of the
United States Supreme Court in the case of East Ohio Gas Company v. Tax Com-mission of Ohio.33 There the gas company purchased gas mined in West Virginia
at the Ohio-West Virginia line and piped it at the same pressure to various points
within the state where the pressure was reduced and the gas was sent out over
distribution lines to local supply mains. The State of Ohio attempted to impose
an excise tax on the sales of such gas, and the gas company contended that the
sales were in interstate commerce. Mr. Justice Butler, speaking for a unanimous
court,'held that the mere change of title to the gas at the state line did not determine
the question of where the interstate commerce ended. But it was pointed out that
when the gas passed from the distribution lines into the supply mains it was relieved of most of its pressure, the volume was expanded and it was divided into many
tiny streams that entered the small service lines connecting the mains with the
pipes on 'the consumer's premises. "The treatment and division of the large compressed volume of gas is like the breaking of an original package, after shipment
in interstate commerce. , .,,34 With the exception that this case involved an effort
on the part of the state to tax certain transactions instead of attempting to regulate
such, the facts in the East Ohio case are similar to those in the Pennsylvania Gas
Company case. The Court recognized this fact, and held that the Pennsylvania
Gas Company case was disapproved to the extent that it was in conflict with the
East Ohio decision. This ruling seemed to put an end to the possibility of the Federal Government controling such sales as those in the Pennsylvania Gas Company
case, by "occupying the field." 35 Herein lies the great difference between the rule
which was set out in the Pennsylvania Gas Company case, and the original package
doctrine. Under the former, the states could control the interstate commerce which
was local in nature, so long as the Federal Government did not act thereon. While
under the latter doctrine, the transaction is considered purely intrastate commerce,
the control over which is generally in the state. This would mean that the adoption
of the East Ohio ruling would greatly reduce the possibility of the Federal Government ever regulating the transactions which were formerly considered interstate
commerce. However, in the case of Illinois Natural Gas Company v. Central Illinois
Public Service Company, 8 the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out
that earlier decisions turned by applying the mechanical test for determining when
32.
(1938).
33.
34.
35.
611, 676

Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Dept. of Public Utilities, 304 U. S. 61
283 U. S. 465 (1931).
Id. at 471.
Howard, Gas and Electricity in Interstate Commerce, 18 MINN. L. REV.
(1934); 49 U. Or Mo. BULL. L. SER: 5, continued in 50 U. or Mo. BULL.

L. Sm. 5, 18 (1935).

36. 314 U. S. 498 (1942).
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interstate commerce ends and intrastate commerce begins, namely "...upon the
introduction of the gas into the service pipes of the distributor."7 The Court

thought the better view was to look to the

"

. .nature of the state regulation in-

volved, the objective of the state, and the effect of the regulation upon the national

interest in the commerce." 3 1 The Pennsylvania Gas Company case was then cited as
an example of this view. The Court, however, left a way out by adding that even

if *itshould be found that the interstate commerce had ceased, the result would be
the same because the transaction in question was so intimately associated with the

commerce, and would so affect its volume moving interstate, as to be within the
congressional power to regulate those matters which materially affect interstate
commerce, as well as the commerce itself.
In the Panhandle cases9 the Court relied upon the Illinois Natural Gas Cornpaty case, and stated that .. . those merely mechanical considerations are no longer
effective, if ever they were exclusively, to determine for regulatory purposes the
interstate or intrastate character of the continuous movement, and resulting sales
we have here." 4 0 Thus it would seem that the Supreme Court for the present at least,
has turned back from its decision in the East Olio case, to again embrace the holding in the Pennsylvania Natural Gas Company case, that the shipment of, gas
directly to the consumer from out of state, is not affected by the original package
doctrine, and is considered interstate commerce.
After it is decided that the transaction in question constitutes interstate commerce, but of such a local nature that it can be regulated by the state until the
Federal Government acts thereon, the question then arises as to just when the
Federal Government does occupy the field. As we have seen, it had become well settled, that the states could regulate the transportation and sale of natural gas which
was purely intrastate commerce, and also the sale of natural gas interstate directly to
the consumer. It was also well settled law that the states could not regulate the sale
of natural gas interstate to an independent distributor for resale to the consumers.
This meant that until the Federal Government acted, the natural gas companies
were to be left uncontrolled as to the latter transaction, and because of the connection between such transaction with the intrastate sales, this placed a hardship
upon the states ip attempting adequately to regulate such industries. It was to
reach those sales that the Federal Natural Gas Act was passed in 1938. 41 This
act gave the Federal Power Commission jurisdiction over (1) the transportation of
natural gas in. interstate commerce; (2) its sale in interstate commerce for resale;
and (3) natural gas' companies engaged in-such transportation or sale. However,
Section I (b) of the act specifically stated: " . .but shall not apply to any other'
transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 504.
Id. at 505.
Supra, note 1.
Id. at 193.
Supra note 6.
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the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural
gas."42
In 1941 the case of United Fuel Gas Company v. Public Utilities Commission
of Okio4 3 was decided, in which it was held by a federal district court that the
Federal Natural Gas Act had occupied the field, to prevent the state from regulating
local features of interstate commerce. There the United Fuel Gas Company produced gas in West Virginia and shipped it to the local distributing corporation in
Portsmouth, Ohio. The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio attempted to regulate
not only the rate at which the local distributing corporation sold its gas, but also
the rate at which the United Fuel Company sold the gas to the local distributing
corporation. The court held that regardless of the right or jurisdiction of the Ohio
Commission to issue the order complained of, the Natural Gas Act deprived it of
any further jurisdiction. The transaction involved was squarely covered by the act.
It was pointed out that prior to the Natural Gas Act, it was permissible for the state
to regulate local features of interstate commerce in gas (citing the Pennsylvania
Gas Company case). But "Since the federal statute has been enacted, giving to
the Federal Power Commission the power to fix the contract rate between plaintiff
and the Portsmouth Gas Company, the Congress has occupied the field and the
power is exclusive in the Federal Power Commission." 44 The court indicated thht
under the Natural Gas Act the Ohio Commission might have filed a complaint with
the Federal Power Commission charging that the rates were unreasonable, and
that the act authoriied the Federal Power Commission to require the gas companies to turn over to the states information from which they could determine whether
the rates were reasonable. This was thought to be sufficient protection for the
states, and that to"allow the states to retain jurisdiction over the gas company in
the face of the Natural Gas Act would be a violation of the commerce clause.
Becquse the Natural Gas Act provided that the Federal Power Commission
should act in such cases, the Court did not find it necessary to determine how much
beyond that point the act would "occupy the field" where the attempted regulation
was local in nature.
In Illinois Natural Gas Company v. Central Illinois Public Service Company,45
the United States Supreme Court discussed the scope of the Federal Natural Gas
Act thoroughly. In that case the Central Public Service Company filed a petition
with the Illinois Commerce Commission for an order requiring the Natural Gas
Company to furnish natural gas to it at wholesale. The latter owned a pipe line
system wholly in Illinois, obtaining its gas interstate from the Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Company. The defense was that the Natural Gas Company was engaged
in interstate commerce, and was therefore under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Federal Power Commission. The state supreme court held that there had been
such a breaking of the bulk that the transaction of the Natural Gas Company was
42.
43.
44.
45.

52 STAT. 821, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1946).
46 F. Supp 309 (S.D. Ohio 1941).
Id. at 313.
Supra note 36.
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purely intrastate commerce and subject to the Jurisdiction of the Illinois Commerce
Commission.4 6 However, the United States Supreme Court held that the transaction
was interstate commerce, and that the Congress, by the Natural Gas Act, had
brought under national control the very matters which the state had undertaken
to regulate by the order.
Mr. Chief Justice Stone went to the original committee reports upon the
Natural Gas Act 47 and pointed out that the avowed purpose of the act was ". . .to
afford, through the exercise of the national power over interstate commerce, an
agency for regulating the wholesale distribution Ito public service companies of
natural gas moving interstate, which this Court had declared to be interstate commerce not subject to certain types of state regulation.... By its enactment Congress
undertook to regulate a defined class of natural gas distribution without the necessity, where Congress has not acted, of drawing the precise line between state and
federal power by the litigation of particular cases." 4 8 The Court then held that
since the Natural Gas Act provided for the control of the extension 'f facilities
for the transportation of natural gas to be in the Federal Power Comfiission, that
the wholesale distribution of gas moving interstate, had been intended to be brought
thereunder.
The Federal Natural Gas Act was again invoked in 1944, when the city of
Cleveland, Ohio requested that the Federal Power Commission check the rates at
which the Hope Natural Gas Company delivered gas to the East Ohio Pipe Line
Company at the Ohio-West Virginia Line. 49 There the gas was produced in West
Virginia by the Hope Company, piped to the West Virginia-Pennsylvania-Ohio lines
where it was sold to various pipe line companies in those states. The East Ohio
Company piped the gas on to Akron and Cleveland where it distributed it directly
to the consumers. The Federal Power Commission, pursuant to the Natural Gas
Act, found the rates charged by the Hope Company to be unreasonable and ordered
46. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Illinois Natural Gas Co., 375 Ill.
634, 32 N.E. 2d 157 (1941).
47. H. REP. No. 709, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess., April 28, 1937. The Committee said of the proposed bill:
"It confers jurisdiction upon the Federal Power Commission over the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, and the sale in interstate commerce
of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial,
industrial, or any other use. The States have, of course, for many years regulated
sales of natural gas to consumers in intrastate transactions. The States have also
been able to regulate sales to consumers even though such sales are in interstate
commerce, such sales being considered local in character and in the absence of Congressional prohibition subject to State regulation. There is no intention in enacting
the present legislation to disturb the States in their exercise of such jurisdiction.
However, in the case of sales for resale, or so-called wholesale sales, in interstate
commerce (for example sales by producing companies to distributing companies)
the legal situation is different. Such transactions have been considered to be not.
local in character and, even in the absence of Congressional action, not subject to
State regulation. The basic purpose of the present legislation is to occupy this field
in which the Supreme Court has held that the States may not act."
48. Illinois Natural Gas Company v. Central Illinois Public Service Company,
supra at 506.
49. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944).
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it to decrease its interstate rates by some three and a half million dollars annually.
The company objected to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission. The
United States Supreme Court held that as stated in the house report on the Natural
Gag Act, the basic purposes of it was to occupy the field in which such cases as
Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Company, 0 and Public Utilities Commission of
Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam and Electric Company' had held the states might

not act. "...the
bill was designed to take 'no authority from State commissipns,'
and was 'so drawn as to complement and in no manner usurp State regulatory
authority.'52 Here the court thought that the Government had occupied the field
and had given the Federal Power Commission jurisdiction to act in such a case.
A review of the above cases would seem to indicate that the Natural Gas Act was
passed by Congress with the intention that it supllement the state action so that
those phases of interstate commerce which up to then were uncontrolled, could be so
regulated. The Panhandle case seems to be a culmination of the efforts of the courts
to ascertain exactly how much of the field the Natural Gas Act has occupied. It
was there pointed out that although Congress intended to occupy the field by the
passage of the Natural Gas Act, it was meticulous to take in only territory which
the courts had held the states could not regulate., 3 And thus it would seem that
Congress has not occupied.the field of interstate activity of a local nature to any
great degree, and that unless the activity in question is specifically set out in the
Natural Gas Act itself, it will be considered to still be within the power of the states
to act thereon.
CLARENCE F. HOMAN
LIAILITY INSURANCE TAKEN OUT By MIssoURI SCHOOL DISTRICTS

The centralization of schools and the consequent extensive use of school busses
b)r school districts has raised some interesting problems in the field of insurance
law.
School districts frequently carry liability insurance in connection with their
ownership and operation of school busses for the transportation of students. These
policies usually contain two clauses which are of importance in considering the value
of such insurance to the school district. The first of these clauses is a follows: "(The
company agrees) to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon him by law for damages, ...

,,' The other clause is: "No action shall lie against the company.

. .

until

50. Supra note 5.
51. 273 U. S. 83 (1927).
52. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra at 611.,
53. 68 Sup. Ct. 190, 196 (U. S. 1947).
1. The quoted provision is taken from a specimen of an automobile policy
which conforms to the Standard Provisions (February, 1946) drafted and promulgated by the National Bureau of Casualty and Surety Underwriters (an organization
of stock casualty companies) and the Mutual Casualty Insurance Bureau (an
organization of mutual casualty companies), which together formulate basic policy
provisions for use in connection with rate schedules in most parts of the United
States. The quoted provision is also found in the few policies examined by me
which are being used in Missouri at the present time.
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the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally determined
either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by written agreement
of the insured, the claimant and the companyY2
Although the language of the two clauses differs to some extent, they both
make a judgment against the insured or liability at law of the insured, a condition
precedent to recovery from the insurer by the injured party.3 If the insured is a
school district this condition precedent cannot be satisfied because it is the general
rule in the United States, which is followed in Missouri, that a school district is
4
not liable in tort for injuries sustained by reason of the negligence of its employees.
Thus it has been held that the injured party could not have the advantages of the
liability insurance although the school district had paid a substantial sum in premiums to the insurer.5
The exact question has not arisen in Missouri but a recent decision of the
Kansas City Court of Appeals, Stedem v. Jewish MemorialHospital Ass'in. of Kansas
City,G the holding and reasoning of which have been expressly approved by the
supreme court,7 would seem to indicate that the injured party could not recover
from the insurer without obtaining a judgient against the insured. In the Stedem
case, defendant was a charitable hospital and plaintiff was a patient injured by
reason of the negligence of a nurse employed by the deferidant. Defendant hospital
was insured against liability for the negligence of its employees by a policy which
contained an agreement by the insurer "to pay all loss by reason of the liability
imposed by law. . . upon the Insured. . ." Defendant, being a charitable hospital,
was not liable in tort (or the negligence of its employees. The court said at page
471: "It thus appears, by the terms of the policy, that the insurance company agreed
to pay any loss of the insured (the defendant) to the extent of the latter's liability,
only. . . .To hold that defendant's liability was increased by the mere existence
of the insurance policy would, in effect, be writing A different contract of insurance
than that entered into between the parties." Although the action was not against
the insurer in this case the language of the court quoted above would indicate that
2. See note 1 supra.
3. American Indeimnity Company v. Hale, 71 F. Supp. 529" (W.D. Mo.
1947); Taverno v. American Auto Ins. Co., 232 Mo. App. 820, 112 S.W. 2d 941
(1938); 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcnrcE § 4853 (1942); 6, Part 2,
BIAsFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AuToMOBILE LAW AND TPRACTICE § 4073 (1945).
4. Krueger v. Board of Education, 310 Mo. 239, 274 S.W. 811 (1925); Dick
v. Board of Education, 238 S.W. 1073 (Mo. 1922); Cochran v. Wilson, 287 Mo. 210,
229 S.W. 1050 (1921); McClure Brothers v. Sehool District of Tipton, 79 Mo. App.
80 (1899). 47 AM. Jui., Schools, § 57; 56 C.J., Schools and School Districts, § 622;
Note 160 A.L.R. 11 (1946) (This note contains 273 pages and appears to completely
cover the problem of tort liability of school districts).
5. Ayers v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 106 F. 2d 958 (C.C.A. 5th
1939); Hughes v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 223 Ala. 59, 134 So. 461
(1931); Kesman v. School District of Fallowfield Township, 345 Pa. 457, 29 At.
2d 17 (1942); Boice v. Board of Education of Rock District, 160 S.E. 566 (W. Va.
1931); accord, Brooks v. Clark County, 297 Ky. 549, 180 S.W. 2d 300 (1944).
6. 187 S.W. 2d 469 (Mo. App. 1945); cf. Haines v. Harrison, 211 S.W. 2d
489 (Mo. 1948).
7. Dille v. St. Luke's Hospital, 355 Mo. 436, 196 S.W. 2d 615 (1946).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss1/8

16

et al.: Masthead and Comments

92

".

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

under a policy containing such a provision, the liability of the insured would have
to be established by a judgment before the injured party could recover from the
insurer.
It has frequently been argued on behalf of the pupil injured because of the
negligent operation of a school bus that the immunity, from a suit in tort, of a
school district should be held to be waived when the district carries liability insurance. In the absence of statutory regulation s this argument has not prevailed.,
The foregoing discussion covers situations where the policy contains no extended coverage or omnibus clause. Such clauses usually read as follows: "The
unqualified word 'insured'. . . includes the named insured and, . . . also 'includes
any person while using the automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided actual use of the automobile is with the permission of the named insured.
It has been held, when the policy contains
an omnibus clause, that a judgment against a person using the vehicle with the
permission of the owner is an "insured" within the clause specifying that "No action
shall lie against the company..
until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay
shall have been finally determined either by judgment against the insured after
actual trial orby written agreement of the insured, the claimant and the company."'I
Thus the injured party can proceed against the insurer after recovering a judgment
against the person using the vehicle with the permission of the named insured.12
If the policy carried by the school district contained an omnibus clause it
would at least make it possible for the injured pupil to receive the advantage of the
policy and to recover from the insurer in most cases. This would be accomplished
by first bringing an action against the driver of the school bus and then after
final judgment was rendered in that action, proceeding against the insurer.' 3 If
the purpose of the school district is to give protection to the members of the community in case of a tragic accident, then a policy containing an omnibus clause
would probably accomplish that purpose. However, some situations can be imagined
where an omnibus clause would not give the desired result. If the board were
responsible for the maintenance of the bus and an accident resulted because of the
board's negligence while the driver was not negligent, then an omnibus clause would
8. Taylor v. Knox County Board of Education, 292 Ky. 767, 167 S.W. 2d
700 (1942). (This case gives an interesting account of the reason for the adoption
of a statute making school districts liable in tort to the amount of the insurance
carried. The Kentucky statute was passed in 1940 after a pupil was killed by the
operation of a school bus in 1938. The administrator of the pupil killed was not
allowed to recover although the school district carried liability insurance.)
9. Wallace v. Laurel County Board of Education, 287 Ky. 454, 153 S.W.
2d 915 (1941); Kesman v. Fallowfield Township School District, 345 Pa. 457, 29
At. 2d 17 (1942). Note 145 A.L.R. 1337 (1943).
10. See note 1 supra.
11. Elliott v. Behner, 150 Kan. 876, 96 P. 2d 852 (1939); Lajoie v. Central
West Casualty Co., 228 Mo. App. 701, 71 S.W. 2d 803 (1934); Di Gregorio v. Skinner, 351 Pa. 448, 41 Atl.-2d 653 (1945); Government Personnel Automobile Ass'n.
v. Haag, 131 S.W. 2d 978 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
12. See note 11 supra.
13. Mo. REv. STAT. § 6010 (1939).
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be of no value to the injured pupil. Another situation where the omnibus clause
would not allow the injured pupil to recover is presented in a recent Missouri
case.' 4 The case holds that if the tort-feasor dies before a suit has been filed the
cause of action does not survive. Thus if the driver-were killed in an accident
caused by his negligence or if he died before.a suit was brought against him then
the injured pupil could not satisfy the condition precedent of a judgment against
the insured and could not recover from the insurer. It should also be noted that the
driver employed by the school district is getting the benefit of liability insurance
while the school district pays the premium although it has no need for liability insurance since it is not liable in tort.
There would seem to be a real question in regard to the authority of a school
district to carry liability insurance on school busses owned and operated by it. If
such authority is to be found in Missouri it must come from Missouri Revised
Statutes § 10326 (1939) which reads in part as follows: "The board of directors ...
shall have authority and are empowered to make all needful rules and regulations for
the free transportation of pupils herein provided, for, and .are authorized to and
shall require from every person, employed for that purpose, a reasonable 'bond for
the faithful discharge of his duties,

. . "

There are no cases in Missouri on this

problem but the courts of Tennessee and West Virginia have considered cases involving statutes of the same general nature as the Missouri Statute.25
In the Tennessee case1 6 the statute relied upon as giving the county board of
education authority to take out liability insurance was as follows: "Transportation
may be provided for groups of children of school age. .. ; provided, further, that the
county board of education may require the driver of any vehicle to make bond in
the amount not less than five hundred dollars for the faithful performance of the
duties that the position imposes; . . ."17 The court reasons that the authority of

the board to require the driver to give a bond , . .is but a mode of insuring against
the consequences of his negligence." 18 Thus if the board insures against the consequences of the driver's negligence by liability insurance it serves the purpose of
the statute and is within the authority of the county Poard of education. Section
10326 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (1939) contains a clause which is almost
identical with the one stressed by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in reaching
the decision that a school district has authority to carry liability insurance. The
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 9 reached a result contrary to that of
the Tennessee court previously discussed. It was an action by a board of education
to collect $708.85 which represented the amount of premiums on a liability policy
carried by plaintiff's predecessor for a period of one year. A statute gave the board
14. Haines v. Harrison, 211 S.W. 2d 489 (Mo. 1948).
15. Rogers v. Butler, 170 Tenn. 125, 92 S.W. 2d 414 (1936); Board of Education v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 116 W. Va. 503, 182 S.E. 87 (1935).
.16. Rogers v. Butler, supra note 15.
17. TENN. CODIE § 2495 (1932).
18. Rogers v. Butler, 170 Tenn. 125, 92 S.W. 2d 414 at 415 (1936).
19. Board of Education v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 116 W. Va. 503,
182 S.E. 87 (1935).
'
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authority "to provide at public expense for the transportation of pupils to and
from. . . consolidated schools, or other schools where transportation of pupils may
be necessary."20 The court held'that this statute was not sufficient to give either
express or implied authority to the district board to procure liability insurance.
The fact which, according to the court, was the most impressive was that the school
district was paying a substantial premium and was getting very little in return. The
defendant insurance company urged that the policy was of value to the board,
namely: (1) to enable passengers and the public to enforce the personal liability of
bus drivers for negligence; (2) to pay the expense of litigation and all costs taxed
against the insured; (3) to defend any suit even if groundless; (4) to reimburse the
assured for any surgical relief imperative at the time of the accident. The court
points out that these services are merely of secondary importance and would not
justify the substantial premium paid for the policy. Primarily the policy was to
insure the school district against legal liability and the district being immune
from liability in tort, the policy did not accomplish that purpose. The court thug
held that no implication of authority to procure liability insurance could arise in the
situation just discussed.
The two cases are not necessarily contra as the statutes involved are couched
in slightly different terms. If the matter arose in Missouri the reasoning of the
Tennessee Court could be followed as Missouri Revised Statutes § 10326 gives
the board of directors authority to require the bus driver employed to give a bond
just as did the Tennessee statute. Query whether the authority to require a bond
which would be paid for by the employee should by implication give the board
authority to carry liability insurance which would be paid for by the board.
The West Virginia statute and Missouri Revised Statutes § 10326 would both
seem to give the board of educition general power to deal with free transportation
of pupils. Neither of the statutes contains any specific provisions which are helpful
in solving the problem as to the authority of a school district to take out liability
insurance. Thus since neither statute grants express authority, the fact that the
West Virginia court inquired as to what the school district is getting in return for its
premium and found that the protection afforded by the policy did not justify the
substantial premium would seem to be entitled to a great deal of weight in any
future adjudication concerning the problem.
Liability insurance, like other forms of insurance, must be supported by an
insurable interest in the insured. Contracts of insurance not founded on such an
interest would be void as wagering contracts. 21 An insurable interest exists, in the
case under consideration, where the insured may be liable for damages resulting

20. W. VA. CoDE § 18-5-13 (1931).

21. Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp. v. Bear, 220 Ala. 491, 125 So. 676
1(1929); Commonwealth Casualty Co. v. Arrigo, 160 Md. 595, 154 Atl. 136 (1931);
Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Bambrick Bros. Construction Co.,
163 Mo. App. 504, 143 S.W. 845 (1912). 29 AM. JUR., Insurance, § 376; 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PaAcricE § 4253 (1942); 1 COOLEY'S BRIEFS ON INsuRANcE 326 (2d ed. 1927); 44 C.J.S., Insurance, § 198; Note 77 A.L.R. 1256 (1932).
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from the use of the vehicle upon which the insurance is carried.2? Although no cases
have been found on the question, it would seem that, if the school district were
the only insured under the policy and could not be liable for the type of injuries
supposedly insured against, then there would be a lack of insurable interest and the
policy would be void as a wagering contract. However, if the policy had an omnibus
or extended coverage clause anyone using the vehicle with the permission of the
named insured would also be an insured. Thus the driver employed by the district
would be an insured under the policy and would have an insurable interest in that
he might be liable for damages resulting from the use of the vehicle upon which
the insurance is carried. It would seem then that if the policy contained an omnibus
clause it would be supported- by an insurable interest and not void as a wagering
cdntract.
ROBERT L. Ross

22. Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp. v. Bear, 220 Ala. 491, 125 So. 676
(1929); Commonwealth Casualty Co. v. Arrigo, 160 Md. 595, 154 At. 136 (1931).
29 AM. JUR., Insurance § 376; 1 CooLEY'S BRIEFS ON INSURANCE, 326 (2d ed. 1927);
44 C.J.S., Insurance § 198; VANCE, INSURANCE § 50 (2d ed. 1930).
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